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IS IT RATIONAL TO ASSUME
RATIONALITY IN BUSINESS?
The author challenges a basic concept underlying the workings of business; perhaps 
you, too, will wonder about some of your business decisions—and about some of the 
financial statements you prepare or read.
  Ula K. Motekat, CPA
Amherst, Massachusetts
The beginning student of economic theory 
is usually completely bewildered when he is 
told to assume perfect competition. For, in 
economics, it means perfect knowledge of the 
market by everybody, innumerable buyers and 
sellers, and complete substitutability of pro­
ducts.
If he is the questioning type, he might ask 
himself whether Mustangs, Cougars, and Bar­
racudas can be substituted for one another. 
After all, they are all animals. But if the com­
mercials are correct, the similarity ends right 
there and substitutability goes out the power 
window.
The innumerable buyers do not present a 
problem (at least not to the student who deals 
with them only in the abstract), since there are 
millions of animal lovers and car buyers. But 
innumerable sellers?—that is too ridiculous to 
be contemplated, even by a beginning eco­
nomics student, for doesn’t Detroit have a 
corner on the market?
And perfect knowledge? No one could stay 
in his right mind if he visited all the pet shops 
(and car dealers) in town without a detour to 
his friendly psychiatrist.
Just when the economics student has come 
to the conclusion that the ivy-covered econ 
prof has turned off and dropped out, he is told 
that perfect competition is, alas, virtually non­
existent in America. It is, however and never­
theless, useful for the model building that 
goes on in economics textbooks (and will ap­
pear on the next examination) even if it is not 
applicable to the real world of General Motors, 
U.S. Steel, and IBM.
The beginning business student is usually 
not that fortunate. He is rarely told that most 
disciplines in the business college assume ra­
tionality on the part of business—and he is 
seldom, if ever, asked to think about the con­
sequences of removing that assumption.
What basis is there for assuming rationality 
in business? What happens if that assumption 
is removed?
Is the Investor Rational?
A very obvious example to illustrate the 
student’s dilemma is the stock market. Numer­
ous finance textbooks devote many pages to 
the various rational methods of arriving at the 
value of a share of common stock (in an al­
most perfectly competitive market, as the 
economics professor was happy to point out). 
Prominent among these methods are the more 
or less incomprehensible equations which, due 
to the profusion of sigma and delta symbols, 
are all Greek to the student. In this rational 
stock market, the value of one common share 
is equal to all sorts of fractions which do—or 
do not—include, either above or below the 
dividing line, dividends per share, earnings 
per share (both primary and fully diluted), 
market capitalization rates, and growth factors 
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—some of them being present actual figures, 
others representing future expected figures. 
The one thing most of these model builders 
agree on is that stock market prices will rise, 
resulting in capital gains to the stockholders, 
if profits are retained and earn at least the 
same rate of return as last year’s net assets.
In simple statistical terms, this means that 
a positive correlation exists between book value 
and Wall Street’s stock market quotation. And 
that, of course, is great news for the accoun­
tant!!
But abstract model building is one thing, 
economic reality is another. To bridge the gap 
between the two, many studies have been con­
ducted to discover the correlation between 
actual stock prices and the researcher’s pet 
formula. Several textbooks even go so far as to 
mention specifically that the rational investor 
should be indifferent as to whether the com­
pany’s earnings are retained or paid out in 
dividends—assuming either no income taxes 
or identical tax rates for dividends and capital 
gains. But when this assumption is lifted (and 
that does happen every so often) and the 
existing higher ordinary income rates on divi­
dends are included in the analysis, the in­
escapable conclusion is that the rational in­
vestor should definitely prefer retained to 
distributed earnings.
An arithmetical example can illustrate this 
line of reasoning—if a company retains one 
dollar of earnings and increases net income by 
seven cents, it realizes 7% on its investment, a 
fairly easy accomplishment for all but perfectly 
competitive enterprises. If the dollar is paid 
out in dividends and the stockholder is in the 
30% bracket, he has only seventy cents left 
after taxes (ignoring the cost of hiring a psy­
chiatrist or a CPA, depending on whether he 
does or does not prepare his own tax return). 
To get the same seven cent return, he must 
invest his seventy cents at 10%, a feat that 
might prove difficult even for somebody in the 
30% bracket on a joint return. Given the lower 
capital gains rates, retained earnings have an­
other advantage in the rational world of the 
finance textbooks—since the dollar of retained 
earnings increases the value of the stock by 
one dollar—according to most mathematical 
formulas—the investor will keep 750 of that 
dollar when he sells his stock and pays his 
capital gains tax of 25%. So retained earnings 
have two advantages: they save the investor’s 
time in looking for profitable investments for 
his dividends and they save him money when 
he does sell his stock holdings. All this happens 
in a rational stock market among rational in­
vestors!
But what happens in the real world? The 
investor prefers dividends! In an often-cited 
study Oskar Harkavy1 came to the conclusion 
that, other things being equal, the firm paying 
dividends enjoys a higher market price of its 
stock and a higher price-earnings ratio than 
the retentive firm. Cottle and Whitman found 
in their study of the relationship between 
earnings and market prices2 that, from 1947 to 
1955, rising stock prices were due to increases 
in the price-earnings ratios which were in­
fluenced by higher dividend payout rates, 
rather than by higher earnings. And lately 
there is a rumor that a good financial relations 
consultant can do wonders for the price-earn­
ings ratio. One such miracle worker takes 
credit for increasing a client’s price from nine 
to fifteen times earnings.3
1 Oskar Harkavy, “The Relationship Between Re­
tained Earnings and Common Stock Prices,” THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol. 8 (September 
1953), pp. 283-297.
2 Sidney Cottle and Tate Whitman, Corporate 
Earning Power and Market Valuation 1935-1955 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 49.
3 “The Art of Blocking That Take-Over,” NEWS­
WEEK (December 16, 1968), p. 85.
In spite of this evidence that the real-life 
investor prefers dividends to retained earnings, 
the finance textbooks and journals have not 
relegated the rational investor to the footnotes 
and the appendices. On the contrary, they look 
for logical reasons for his preference for divi­
dends. (Fortunately they do not stoop to rescu­
ing their equations with the aid of the old 
cliche that women—who do own a lot of stock 
—are “naturally” illogical and irrational. And 
three cheers for them!) In their search for 
rationality in investor behavior they apparently 
remembered the “information content” of the 
Federal Reserve Bank's discount rate (which 
crops up in the money and banking textbooks), 
so they reasoned that dividends, too, must have 
an “information content.” In their thinking, a 
cash dividend tells the investor that the com­
pany did, indeed, make a profit and has, in 
fact, neatly bundled stacks of greenbacks sitting 
in the bank vault. This means that a check for 
50¢ is more convincing than the CPA’s opinion 
on the financial statements with their million 
dollar cash balance and billion dollar profit. 
The inescapable conclusion is that either the 
CPAs have botched their public relations job— 
or the investor is not rational.
In view of the above (and because the 
author is a CPA), it does not seem logical to 
assume rational behavior on the part of the in­
vestor. In fact, the assumption of irrationality 
may be much more rational. Some investors 
use charts—the athletic ones wave their pen­
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nants and Hags, while the sporty types chase 
after double tops and double bottoms. Others 
use a hot tip from the barber who just shaved 
Mr. Gillette, a whisper from the bartender who 
just served Mr. Seagram, an operation (surgical 
or otherwise) in the White House, or simply 
the “bigger fool theory.” That well-known 
theory states that there will hopefully be a 
bigger fool to buy the stock at a higher price 
in the future. And that goes right to the heart 
of accounting.
Is the Accountant Rational?
Is it rational to assume that investors use 
published financial statements to make invest­
ment decisions? Accountants seem to assume 
that investors do—they never tire of cautioning 
statement readers against placing too much 
emphasis on that one “net income” figure. It is, 
after all, based on estimates and assumptions. 
The estimates most frequently mentioned are 
the useful lives of long-lived assets and the 
collectibility of receivables. The assumptions 
most often stated are the “going concern” and 
the “stable dollar.” But does anybody ever 
voice the assumption of rationality?
What happens to accounting if it is assumed 
that business is not rational? The first notion 
to come under suspicion is the “cost” concept, 
a fundamental idea in accounting. Cost is so 
popular because it is objective, according to 
professional opinion. Its objectivity seems to 
rest solely on the fact that two people (or two 
hundred for that matter) can look at the same 
invoice and the check in payment for it and 
agree that this amount is indeed what was paid 
for the asset or service and is, therefore, its cost.
But how valid is the “cost” of an asset if it is 
assumed that whoever purchased it acted ir­
rationally? Maybe the purchaser bought from 
AT&T (Acme Tambourine and Trampoline) 
because its salesman has been buying him 
martinis for years with nary an order (and 
wining and dining prospective customers must 
increase sales, otherwise the rational-acting 
sales department would do away with expense 
allowances). Or perhaps he bought from them 
because a neighbor, golf partner, or friend 
works for it, so it has to be a good firm. Or, 
simpler yet, that was the first company his 
fingers came to when they walked through the 
yellow pages.
The objectivity of cost rests also on the as­
sumption that cost equals fair market value, as 
Curtis Stanley points out in his persuasive 
argument.4 In other words, the amount paid for 
4 Curtis H. Stanley, “Cost-Basis Valuations in 
Transactions Between Entities,” THE ACCOUNT­
ING REVIEW (July 1964), pp. 639-647.
5 Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A 
Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for 
Business Enterprises (New York: AICPA, 1962), 
p. 8.
an asset constitutes its market price, whatever 
that is. Market price, to be valid, has to go 
back to beginning economics and the assump­
tion of perfect competition. In that happy 
world of Adam Smith, no seller can ask a high­
er price because no buyer would pay it since 
he has perfect knowledge and knows therefore 
what “the” market price really is. That, ob­
viously, is not the case in the American 
economy.
It is manifestly impossible to establish “the” 
market price of a pack of Brand X cigarettes. 
It varies from the 40¢ charged by the chain 
supermarkets, via the 60¢ asked by the special­
ity cigar store in the swank downtown hotel, 
to the $1.50 appearing on the bill from the 
Playboy Club. If there are several prices for a 
pack of cigarettes, is it rational to assume just 
one market price for a desk, an adding ma­
chine, or a wastepaper basket? The significance 
of the undepreciated balance of fixed assets in 
the balance sheet and the depreciation expense 
in the income statement is certainly impaired 
if it is admitted that the office furniture could 
have been bought at bargain basement prices 
or from an old customer who needed the order 
but charged a little more.
Hardly less important than the cost concept 
is the idea of an asset. A generally acceptable 
definition is advanced by Sprouse and Moonitz 
who state that assets are “expected future eco­
nomic benefits, rights to which have been ac­
quired by the enterprise as a result of some 
current or past transaction.”5
Under this definition an oil well, a share of 
IBM, and the company’s Barracuda all qualify 
as assets. And so does a patent. But what is the 
difference in future economic benefits between 
an invention coming out of some far-away ivory 
tower and one developed in the company’s own 
laboratory as long as they both confer exclusive 
rights to that proverbial better mousetrap? 
Surely, the difference in patents is caused by 
the originality of their ideas (at least, that is 
the basis on which the U.S. Patent Office 
works), not by their method of acquisition. 
But in many company ledgers, the purchased 
patent is an asset and the homemade one is an 
expense.
Every businessman will agree that the major 
reason for employing bearded geniuses and 
subsidizing “Marcus Welby, M.D.” or “The 
Tonight Show” is the improvement of future 
earnings. Yet, generally acceptable accounting 
principles sanction expensing these outlays 
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when incurred, rather than capitalizing them 
as assets. The reason usually given by accoun­
tants for this treatment is that it is too difficult 
to separate the expenditures that will benefit 
the future from the ones that will not (and, 
besides, it’s deductible now for tax purposes).
A nonaccountant (and sometimes even an 
accountant) could here draw the conclusion 
that the criterion for classifying an item as an 
asset is its ease of computation. But if that 
were so, then rent and utilities would be assets 
since they are the easiest things to compute. 
By now the thoroughly puzzled nonaccountant 
might decide that an asset must possess both 
characteristics—it must confer future economic 
benefits and it must be easy to compute. And 
then, lo and behold, homemade goodwill quali­
fies because it does confer future economic 
benefits and it is so easy to compute that it 
only appears in the intermediate, not the ad­
vanced, accounting textbooks.
Digging deeper, below the cost and asset 
concepts, one discovers the assumption under­
lying all of it. Although rarely expressing it, ac­
countants assume that all of a firm’s expendi­
tures are made on a rational basis, i.e., to in­
crease or maintain profits.
But how many bosses ever try to figure 
out whether a cute mini-skirted receptionist at 
$25 more than a midi-skirted one contributes 
$25 a month more to profits?
Who knows whether a genuine imported 
Persian carpet at double (or more) the price 
of a domestic nylon rug increases profits? Or 
whether executives make better decisions at 
solid walnut desks than they do at simple 
metal ones?
Does anybody ever sit down and figure out 
whether the profits made on orders resulting 
from bulk mailings offset the ill will created in 
people resenting the flood of junk mail? Or 
whether the capital asset acquired, a decision 
based on many 10-column sheets of marginal 
cost analysis prepared by the accounting de­
partment, was as profitable as had been es­
timated? (It should be pointed out here that 
computations of the profitability of prospective 
capital outlay occupy vastly more space in ac­
counting textbooks than do retrospective com­
parisons.)
And how many accountants, owning a share 
of Litton or LTV, have questioned whether a 
merger (treated either as a pooling or a pur­
chase, depending on which one produced the 
better-looking financial statements) was under­
taken to increase profits or, as Galbraith would 
maintain,6 to satisfy management’s desire for 
job security and status in the business world?
What all this boils down to is the question— 
is it rational to assume rationality in business? 
After all, business consists of people. The man 
who smokes Brand X cigarettes because you 
can’t take the country out of them may be the 
purchasing agent. The man who pays 25% in­
terest on the installment contract for his color 
TV set because everyone in his neighborhood 
has one may be the financial vice-president. 
And the man who waters and fertilizes his 
lawn to make it grow faster so he can spend 
more time cutting and cursing it may be the 
management efficiency expert. Is it rational 
to expect all these people to shed their irra­
tional attitudes and to become rational in­
dividuals the moment they walk into their 
carpeted corner offices and sit down in their 
swivel chairs?
6John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial 
State (New York: The New American Library. 
Inc., 1968), pp. 181-183.
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Today, top management—armed with computers and instantaneous retrieval capability—has to pass 
the word as fast as it's obtained, not unlike a classy third baseman must field a bunt—pick up the 
ball on a dead run and fire to first base in one smooth motion. No easy trick, to be sure. But there 
is a management tool gaining wide acceptance in industry that takes on the characteristic of swift and 
smooth communication—the decision room.
In essence, the decision room is a tool to seize and disseminate information to top management in 
the quickest and most effective way possible. It is a room different from the conference room because it 
is especially designed and equipped to tune in its users to only the important information required in 
sound decision making.
Working on the theory that perception is sharpened in direct proportion to the number of human senses 
affected, the decision room subliminally stimulates all five senses. In a phase, it manipulates an en­
vironment so that those in its realm collectively focus and communicate on only matters brought before 
them.
Decision Room—A "Cool" Medium, 
Warren Moulds, GENERATION, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, November 1969.
